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Abstract
When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a
satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium.
In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern, the total system travel time can be worse than
in the case of the PRUE. We show how bad the worst-case satisficing user equilibrium traffic
pattern can be, compared to the perfectly rational user equilibrium. We call the ratio between
the total system travel times of the two traffic patterns the price of satisficing, for which we
provide an analytical bound. We compare the analytical bound with numerical bounds for
several transportation networks.
Keywords: bounded rationality; satisficing; user equilibrium
1 Introduction
Instead of assuming a perfectly rational person with a clear system of preferences and perfect knowl-
edge of the surrounding decision-making environment, we can consider boundedly rational persons
with (1) an ambiguous system of preferences and (2) lack of complete information, following Simon
(1955). When decision makers are indifferent among alternatives within a certain threshold, they
are called satisficing decision makers, opposed to optimizing decision makers. The notion of satisfic-
ing was first introduced by Simon (1955, 1956). Satisficing decision makers choose any alternative
whose utility level is above a threshold, called an aspiration level, even when the alternative is
not optimal. The satisficing behavior is related to the first source of boundedness—an ambiguous
system of preferences.
In transportation research, modeling drivers’ route choice is an important task. While the
travel-time minimization has been traditionally used as a basis for such modeling, sub-optimal route-
choice behavior has gained attention. Since Mahmassani and Chang (1987), bounded rationality
∗Corresponding author: chkwon@usf.edu
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has gained attention in the transportation research literature (Szeto and Lo, 2006; Wu et al., 2013;
Han et al., 2015; Szeto and Lo, 2006; Ge and Zhou, 2012; Di et al., 2014; Guo, 2013; Lou et al.,
2010). Empirical evidence supports bounded rationality of drivers (Nakayama et al., 2001; Zhu and Levinson,
2010). The notion of bounded rationality has also been considered in the evaluation of value of
times in connection to route-choice modeling (Xu et al., 2017), and in the model of behavior ad-
justment process (Ye and Yang, 2017). We refer readers to a review of Di and Liu (2016). In the
non-transportation literature, the notion of bounded rationality and satisficing has also received
much attention (Charnes and Cooper, 1963; Lam et al., 2013; Jaillet et al., 2016; Chen et al., 1997;
Brown and Sim, 2009).
While the above-mentioned transportation research literature considers boundedly rational
drivers, their discussion is limited to satisficing drivers without considering the second source of
boundedness: lack of complete information on the decision environment. Sun et al. (2018) connect
the first and the second sources of boundedness by considering both satisficing behavior and incom-
plete information, in the context of shortest-path finding in congestion-free networks. Sun et al.
(2018) study the second source by considering errors in drivers’ perception of arc travel time, and
conclude that their perception-error model can generally capture both sources of boundedness in
rationality in a single unified modeling framework.
In the literature, the traditional network user equilibrium, Wardrop equilibrium in particular,
is called the perfectly rational user equilibrium (PRUE), while a traffic pattern equilibrated among
satisficing drivers is called a boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE). In this paper, we will
use a new term satisficing user equilibrium (SatUE) instead of BRUE to emphasize that it only
considers the first source of boundedness without considering drivers’ incomplete information on
the decision environment. We believe that the term ‘BRUE’ should be used to describe a broader
and more general class of models, including SatUE.
Note that SatUE differs from the stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) (Sheffi, 1985) in two im-
portant aspects. First, drivers are assumed to be optimizing decision makers in SUE, while they
are satisficing in SatUE. Second, with appropriate probability distributions assumed in the random
utility model in SUE, each path possesses a probability of being chosen; hence we can compute the
expected traffic flow rate in each path. In SatUE, however, each satisficing path is acceptable to
drivers, but it may or may not be chosen by drivers and we do not know its probability of being
chosen. See further discussion in Di and Liu (2016).
The main contribution of this paper is the quantification of how bad the total system travel
time in SatUE can be. In a SatUE traffic pattern, the total system travel time can be either greater
than or less than that of PRUE. We define the price of satisficing (PoSat) as the ratio between
the worst-case total system travel time of SatUE and the total system travel time of PRUE. This
paper quantifies PoSat analytically and compares with numerical bounds.
The analytical quantification of PoSat is related to the price of anarchy (PoA) (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou,
1999; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002) that compares the performances of the system optimal solu-
tions and the PRUE solutions. Using a similar idea, we can also compare the performance of the
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perfectly rational user equilibrium traffic patterns and satisficing user equilibrium traffic patterns.
While PoA quantifies how much system-wide performance we can lose by competing, PoSat quanti-
fies how much we can lose by satisficing. Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) define and study the PoA
of approximate Nash equilibria, which are essentially SatUE patterns. We develop our bounds for
PoSat based on the bounds for PoA of approximate Nash equilibria (Christodoulou et al., 2011) and
the ideas from the sensitivity analysis of traffic equilibria (Dafermos and Nagurney, 1984). Note
that Perakis (2007) studies the PoA of the exact Nash equilibria with general nonlinear, asymmetric
cost functions.
The notion of PoSat is also related to the price of risk aversion (Nikolova and Stier-Moses, 2015)
and the deviation ratio (Kleer and Scha¨fer, 2016). When network users are risk-averse decision
makers, the price of risk aversion compares the performances of the resulting equilibrium among
risk-averse users and the (risk-neutral) PRUE. When network users’ cost functions are deviated
from the true cost functions for some reasons, the deviation ratio compares the performances of the
resulting equilibrium and the PRUE. Kleer and Scha¨fer (2016) show that the price of risk aversion
is a special case of the deviation ratio. In both research articles, however, only cases with a common
single origin node are considered. In this paper, we consider general cases with multiple origin nodes
and multiple destination nodes, with asymmetric travel time functions.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notation and define various
concepts including user equilibrium, system optimum, satisficing behavior, price of anarchy, and
price of satisficing. In Section 3, we define the user equilibrium with perception errors and make
connections with satisficing user equilibrium. Our main result is introduced in Section 4, where
we derive the analytical worst-case bound on the price of satisficing. In Section 5, we compare the
analytical bound with numerical bounds. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Notation and Definitions
Since we will use path-based and arc-based flow variables and their corresponding functions and
sets interchangeably, we need clear definitions of variables, sets, and functions. We use boldfaced
lower-case letters for vector quantities as in v and normal lower-case letters for their components as
in va; similarly, vector-valued functions like t(·) and their components like ta(·). We use boldfaced
upper-case letters for the set that they belong to, as in v ∈ V . We use calligraphic capital letters
for sets of indices as in N . The only exception is that Q (a bold-face capital letter instead of lower
case) represents a vector of Qw, the demand for OD pair w. The lower-case version q
w
i is instead the
net amount of flow associated with OD pair w that enters or leaves node i in the next subsection
2.1 Traffic Flow Variables and Feasible Sets
We consider a network with a set of origin and destination W that is represented by directed graph
G(N ,A), where N is the set of nodes, and A is the set of arcs. For each OD pair w ∈ W, the
travel demand is Qw and the set of available paths is Pw. The set of all available paths in the whole
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network is defined as P = ∪w∈WPw.
We also define the set of path flow variables f as
F =
{
f :
∑
p∈Pw
fp = Qw ∀w ∈ W, fp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P
}
and the corresponding set of arc flow variables v is defined as
V =
{
v : va =
∑
p∈P
δpafp ∀a ∈ A, f ∈ F
}
where δpa = 1 if path p contains arc a and δ
p
a = 0 otherwise. Let A
+
i and A
−
i be the set of arcs
whose tail node and head node are i, respectively. When we need to preserve OD information in
arc flow variables, we use x as follows:
X =
{
x : xwa =
∑
p∈Pw
δpafp ∀a ∈ A, w ∈ W f ∈ F
}
=
{
x :
∑
a∈A+i
xwa −
∑
a∈A−i
xwa = q
w
i ∀w ∈ W, i ∈ N
}
where qwi = −Qw if i = o(w), q
w
i = Qw if i = d(w), and q
w
i = 0 otherwise.
We have va =
∑
p∈P δ
p
afp, x
w
a =
∑
p∈Pw
δ
p
afp, and va =
∑
w∈W x
w
a . Therefore, the transfor-
mations from f to v, from f to x, and from x to v are unique, which are denoted by f 7→ v,
f 7→ x, and x 7→ v, respectively. The inverse transformations are, however, not unique. In the
rest of this paper, to emphasize the non-uniqueness of the transformation and refer to any result
of such transformation, we use
any
7−→; for example, with v
any
7−→ f , we consider any f such that
va =
∑
p∈P δ
p
afp.
We will use v, f , and x interchangeably to describe the same traffic pattern. In particular, we
define
• f∗, v∗, x∗ : system optimal flow vectors (Section 2.2)
• f0, v0, x0 : perfectly rational user equilibrium flow vectors (Section 2.3)
• fκ, vκ, xκ : (multiplicative) satisficing user equilibrium flow vectors with a multiplicative
factor (to be defined subsequently) κ (Section 2.4)
Note that when κ = 0, we have fκ = f0.
2.2 Travel Time Functions and System Optimum
We denote arc travel function with arc traffic volume v by ta(v) for each arc a ∈ A. We consider
a performance function for each arc a as
za(v) = ta(v)va.
4
We denote the travel time function along path p with flow f by cp(f). When written as functions
of x, the arc travel time is denoted as τa(x) or τ
w
a (x), where the latter is used to emphasize the
focus on OD pair w. Of course, τwa (x) = τa(x) = ta(v), where v =
∑
w x
w
a . The performance
function for path p ∈ P is as follows:
zp(f) = cp(f)fp.
The following shows the relationship between path and arc travel times.
cp(f) =
∑
a∈A
δpata(v).
We define the arc-based total system performance function Z(v) and path-based total system
performance function C(f) interchangeably as follows:
Z(v) ≡
∑
a∈A
za(v) =
∑
a∈A
ta(v)va
=
∑
p∈P
zp(f) =
∑
p∈P
cp(f)fp =
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
cp(f)fp ≡ C(f),
which is also called the total system travel time. A flow pattern that minimizes Z(·) or C(·) is
called a system optimal flow pattern.
The vector-valued function t(·) is called monotone in V if
[t(v1)− t(v2)]⊤(v1 − v2) ≥ 0 (1)
for all v1,v2 ∈ V . If (1) holds as a strict inequality for all v1 6= v2, it is said strictly monotone.
The function t(·) is called strongly monotone in V with modulus α > 0 if
[t(v1)− t(v2)]⊤(v1 − v2) ≥ α
∥∥v1 − v2∥∥2
V
(2)
for all v1,v2 ∈ V , where ‖·‖V is the l
2-norm in V . The monotonicity of path-based travel time
function cp(·) or its vector form c(·) can be similarly defined. The path-based function cp(·), however,
is not strongly monotone in general (e.g., see Example 3 in de Palma and Nesterov, 1998).
2.3 Perfectly Rational User Equilibrium
When network users are perfectly rational—they seek the shortest path—we attain the perfectly
rational user equilibrium (PRUE) defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Perfectly Rational User Equilibrium). A traffic pattern f0 is called a perfectly
rational user equilibrium (PRUE), if
(PRUE) f0p > 0 =⇒ cp(f
0) = min
p′∈Pw
cp′(f
0) (3)
5
for all p ∈ Pw and w ∈ W.
Using the arc travel function, the above condition can be restated as follows
f0p > 0 =⇒
∑
a∈A
δpata(v
0) = min
p′∈Pw
∑
a∈A
δp
′
a ta(v
0) (4)
for all p ∈ Pw and w ∈ W.
It is well known that a solution to the following variational inequality problem is a user equilib-
rium traffic flow (Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980):
to find f ∈ F :
∑
p∈P
cp(f)(fp − fp) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , (5)
which can be equivalently rewritten as:
to find v ∈ V :
∑
a∈A
ta(v)(va − va) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V , (6)
or
to find x ∈X :
∑
a∈A
∑
w∈W
τa(x)(x
w
a − x
w
a ) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈X (7)
where τwa (x) = τa(x) = ta(v).
With strictly monotone functions ta(·), the solution v to (6) is unique. While the transfor-
mations v
any
7−→ f and v
any
7−→ x are not unique, any such f and x are solutions to (5) and (7),
respectively; therefore, solutions to (5) and (7) are not unique in general.
When the travel time on arc a is a function of only va, i.e. ta = ta(va), then it is called
separable. With separable arc travel time functions, the variational inequality problem (6) admits
an equivalent convex optimization problem as formulated by (Beckmann et al., 1956). In general,
if the Jacobian matrix of the arc travel time function vector t(v) is symmetric, that is,
∂ta(v)
∂ve
=
∂te(v)
∂va
∀a, e ∈ A,
for all v ∈ V , the variational inequality problem (6) can be reformulated as an equivalent Beckmann-
type convex optimization problem (Patriksson, 2015; Friesz and Bernstein, 2016). When the Ja-
cobian is asymmetric, no Beckmann-type convex optimization problem equivalent to (6) exists in
general. In this case, the arc travel time functions is characterized as asymmetric and obtaining a
PRUE flow requires solving a variational inequality problem.
2.4 Satisficing User Equilibrium
We introduce definitions of satisficing behavior and corresponding user equilibrium traffic patterns.
In transportation research literature, boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE) is often defined
with an additive term (see e.g., Lou et al., 2010; Di et al., 2013; Han et al., 2015). Herein, we refer
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to BRUE in the literature as an ‘additive satisficing user equilibrium’ to (i) highlight its additive
feature and (ii) limit user behavior to just satisficing. Bounded rationality includes behaviors other
than satisficing as well.
Definition 2 (Additive Satisficing). A traffic pattern f is called an additive satisficing user equi-
librium (ASatUE) with an additive factor E , if
(ASatUE) fp > 0 =⇒ cp(f) ≤ min
p′∈Pw
cp′(f) + E (8)
for all p ∈ Pw and w ∈ W, where E is a positive constant.
We can also derive a similar definition using a multiplicative term. While the additive form in
Definition 2 is popularly used in the transportation research literature, the multiplicative form in
Definition 3 enables us to consider the satisficing level in disaggregate arc levels as we will observe in
this paper. Multiplicative satisficing user equilibrium is also called approximate Nash equilibrium
in the price of anarchy literature (Christodoulou et al., 2011).
Definition 3 (Multiplicative Satisficing). A traffic pattern fκ is called a multiplicative satisficing
user equilibrium with a multiplicative factor κ, or κ-MSatUE, if
(MSatUE) fκp > 0 =⇒ cp(f
κ) ≤ (1 + κ) min
p′∈Pw
cp′(f
κ) (9)
for all p ∈ Pw and w ∈ W, where κ ≥ 0 is a constant.
Note that the additive (E) and multiplicative (κ) factor in (8) and (9), respectively, may be
defined for each OD pair w. For example, Ew and κw can replace E and κ in (8) and (9), respec-
tively, to allow for non-homogeneous satisficing thresholds. In such cases, however, we assume that
travelers for the same OD pair are homogeneous with the same threshold Ew or κw. In this paper,
to describe the satisficing behavior, we focus only on MSatUE. Moreover, for simplicity, we use a
single value of κ for all OD pairs.
2.5 Price of Satisficing
The price of anarchy (PoA) compares the performances of a satisficing user equilibrium (C(fκ))
against that of a system optimum (C(f∗)). Among possibly multiple satisficing user equilibrium
traffic patterns, we are interested in the worst-case. Let Ψκ(G,Q, t) be the set of all satisficing user
equilibria with a multiplicative factor κ where G,Q, and t denote the underling network, demand
vector, and travel time function, respectively. Then, the PoA for the triplet (G,Q, t) is defined as
follows:
PoAκ(G,Q, t) = max
fκ∈Ψκ(G,Q,t)
C(fκ)
C(f∗)
, (10)
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where f∗ is the system optimum flow for (G,Q, t). We are usually interested in its upper bound
over a set of triplets, Ω., i.e.
sup
(G,Q,t)∈Ω
PoAκ(G,Q, t)
In the context of bounded rationality and satisficing, we are more interested in comparing the
performance of approximate Nash equilibrium C(fκ) and the performance of the perfectly rational
user equilibrium C(f0). We define the price of satisifcing (PoSat) of instance (G,Q, t) as follows:
PoSatκ(G,Q, t) = max
fκ∈Ψκ(G,Q,t)
C(fκ)
C(f0)
, (11)
and its upper bound over Ω is
sup
(G,Q,t)∈Ω
PoSatκ(G,Q, t)
In this paper, Ω is a set of all triplets where G is a directed graph with a finite number of
nodes and arcs, Q is a vector of finite and positive constants, and t(·) is a vector of polynomial
functions with nonnegative coefficients and of order n ≥ 0. To emphasize the latter, we also write
Ω(n) instead of Ω when appropriate.
3 User Equilibrium with Perception Errors
Related to MSatUE is the user equilibrium with perception error (UE-PE) model. In this model,
we assume that network users are optimizing, i.e. seeking the shortest path; however, we assume
that users may have their own perception of the travel time function.
We let εwa denote the perception error of travel time along arc a of users in OD pair w. A vector
x ∈X is a solution to the UE-PE model, if
∑
a∈A
∑
w∈W
(ta(v)− ε
w
a )(x
w
a − x
w
a ) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈X (12)
The above variational inequality assumes that ε is sufficiently small, i.e., 0 ≤ εwa < ta(v) for all
a ∈ A, w ∈ W. Under such an assumption, ta(v) − ε
w
a can be viewed as the perceived travel time
for arc a for drivers of OD pair w.
The term εwa represents the perception error for arc a and OD pair w. In this model, we assume
all drivers for each OD pair are homogeneous in their perception of arc travel time.
With changes of variables λwa ta(v) = ta(v) − ε
w
a , the UE-PE model (12) can be restated as
follows:
(UE-PE-X)
∑
a∈A
∑
w∈W
λwa ta(v)(x
w
a − x
w
a ) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈X (13)
for some λ such that λwa ∈ (0, 1] for all w ∈ W and a ∈ A. We observe that the UE-PE model
generates a subset of MSatUE traffic flow patterns.
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Lemma 1 (UE-PE-X =⇒ MSatUE). Suppose x is a solution to UE-PE-X in (13) with some λ
where λwa ∈ [
1
1+κ , 1] for all w ∈ W and a ∈ A. Then any f with x
any
7−→ f is a κ-MSatUE flow.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given f , we let v be the arc flow vector from f 7→ v. Let ε be the perception
error that makes x a solution to (12). Then, x is a user equilibrium flow with respect to arc travel
time λwa ta(·) and the following follows from (4):
fp > 0 =⇒
∑
a∈A
δpaλ
w
a ta(v) = min
p′∈Pw
∑
a∈A
δp
′
a λ
w
a ta(v) (14)
for all p ∈ Pw and w ∈ W. Since λ
w
a ∈ [
1
1+κ , 1], the right-hand-side of (14) implies
1
1 + κ
∑
a∈A
δpata(v) ≤ min
p′∈Pw
∑
a∈A
δp
′
a λ
w
a ta(v) ≤ min
p′∈Pw
∑
a∈A
δp
′
a ta(v),
which is equivalent to the following path flow form:
cp(f) ≤ (1 + κ) min
p′∈Pw
cp′(f).
Therefore, we conclude that f is a κ-MSatUE traffic flow.
We can also provide a path-based formulation of UE-PE:
(UE-PE-F )
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
c˜wp (f)(fp − fp) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F (15)
for the perceived path travel time functions c˜wp (f) =
∑
a∈A δ
p
aλ
w
a ta(v) with some λ such that
λwa ∈ (0, 1] for all a ∈ A, w ∈ W.
Lemma 2 (UE-PE-F ⇐⇒ UE-PE-X). If f ∈ F is a solution to UE-PE-F in (15) for some λ such
that λwa ∈ [
1
1+κ , 1], then x with f 7→ x is a solution to UE-PE-X in (13). Conversely, if x ∈ X is
a solution to UE-PE-X in (13), then any f with x
any
7−→ f is a solution to UE-PE-F in (15).
Proof of Lemma 2. We can prove both directions by observing that
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
c˜wp (f)(fp − fp) =
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
∑
a∈A
δpaλ
w
a ta(v)(fp − fp)
=
∑
w∈W
∑
a∈A
λwa ta(v)
( ∑
p∈Pw
δpafp −
∑
p∈Pw
δpafp
)
=
∑
w∈W
∑
a∈A
λwa ta(v)(x
w
a − x
w
a ).
When the values of λwa are the same across all w ∈ W, i.e. λa = λ
w
a for all w ∈ W, we can
9
UE-PE-X
UE-PE-F
UE-PE-V MSatUE (17)
Figure 1: Summary of Lemmas 1–4. The relation X =⇒ Y means that any solution to X yields a
solution to Y.
simplify (13) as follows:
(UE-PE-V )
∑
a∈A
λata(v)(va − va) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V (16)
for some λ such that λa ∈ (0, 1] for each a ∈ A. The simplified model (16) has been considered in
the literature for approximate Nash equilibrium (Christodoulou et al., 2011) and Nash equilibrium
with deviated travel time functions (Kleer and Scha¨fer, 2016). For the simplified model, we can
state:
Lemma 3 (UE-PE-V =⇒ UE-PE-X). Suppose that v ∈ V is a solution to UE-PE-V in (16) for
some λ such that λa ∈ [
1
1+κ , 1] for all a ∈ A. Let x be any vector with v
any
7−→ x. Then x is a
solution to UE-PE-X in (13).
While Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 provide sufficient conditions for a traffic flow pattern to be a κ-
MSatUE, Theorem 1 of Christodoulou et al. (2011) provides a necessary condition. Although
Christodoulou et al. (2011) assumed separable arc travel time functions, their proof is still valid for
nonseparable travel time functions.
Lemma 4 (A necessary condition of MSatUE). Let fκ ∈ F be a κ-MSatUE and vκ ∈ V be the
corresponding arc flow vector with fκ 7→ vκ. Then we have
∑
a∈A
ta(v
κ)((1 + κ)va − v
κ
a) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V . (17)
Christodoulou et al. (2011) derive a tight bound on the price of anarchy on approximate Nash
equilibria based on Lemma 4.
Figure 1 summarizes the relationships between problems addressed in Lemma 1 to 4. Note that
this result does not mean that the notions of UE-PE and SatUE are equivalent in general. Rather,
the specific modeling of UE-PE-X, UE-PE-F , and UE-PE-V with the perception error interval
[ 11+κ , 1], as defined in (13), (15), and (16), respectively, leads to the result in Figure 1. If we use a
different definition of perception error sets, such a result may not hold.
4 Bounding the Price of Satisficing
We first provide analytical bounds of C(fκ) compared to C(f0).
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4.1 Lessons from the Price of Anarchy
We first observe that PoSatκ(G,Q, t) ≤ PoAκ(G,Q, t) for any network instance (G,Q, t), since
C(f0) ≥ C(f∗). This enables us to use the results from the price of anarchy literature for bounding
PoSat. Theorem 2 of Christodoulou et al. (2011) bound the price of anarchy when arc travel-time
functions are separable and polynomial with nonnegative coefficients and of degree n that leads
immediately to the following result:
Lemma 5. Suppose fκ is a κ-MSatUE flow, and ta(·) is polynomial with nonnegative coefficients
and of degree n. Define
ζ(κ, n) =


(1 + κ)n+1 if κ ≥ (n+ 1)1/n − 1,(
1
1+κ −
n
(n+1)(n+1)/n
)−1
if 0 ≤ κ ≤ (n + 1)1/n − 1.
(18)
Then we have
C(f∗) ≤ C(fκ) ≤ ζ(κ, n)C(f∗) ≤ ζ(κ, n)C(f0). (19)
That is, the PoSat is bounded above by ζ(κ, n).
Proof of Lemma 5. From Theorem 2 of Christodoulou et al. (2011), we have
C(fκ) ≤ ζ(κ, n)C(f) ∀f ∈ F . (20)
Picking f = f0 in (20), we obtain the upper bound on C(fκ). Inequalities involving C(f∗) are
from the fact C(f∗) ≤ C(f) for all f ∈ F .
The bound in Lemma 5 is not tight when κ is small. For example, when κ = 0, C(fκ) = C(f0).
Thus, C(f
κ)
C(f0) = 1. On the other hand, (19) yields the following:
C(fκ)
C(f0)
≤
(
1−
n
(n+ 1)
n+1
n
)−1
where the expression on the right is strictly larger than one. For example, the expression reduces
to 43 when n = 1 and approaches infinity when n is large.
In Lemma 3 of Christodoulou et al. (2011), the existence of a network instance with C(fκ) =
(1+κ)n+1C(f∗) is shown for κ ≥ (n+1)1/n− 1 via a circular network example presented in Figure
2. The circular network includes m + l nodes where positive integers m and l are chosen so that
m
l = 1 + κ. All nodes lie in a circle and each node i is adjacent to two neighboring nodes via arc
(i, i+1) and (i−1, i). The arc cost function for arc a is ta(va) = (va)
n, where va is the total arc flow
in arc a. There are m+ l OD pairs (i, i+m) for i = 1, 2, ..,m+ l, with unit demand from node i to
node i+m (indices are taken cyclically). Note that the circular network can be easily converted to
a directed network by replacing each undirected arc with two directed arcs with opposite direction.
11
ii+m
m + k
2
1
Figure 2: Circular Network of Christodoulou et al. (2011)
The cost associated with arc a will be ta(va, v̂a) = (va + v̂a)
n in this case where v̂a is the flow in
the arc with opposite direction.
For each OD pair (i, i +m), there are two paths, clockwise and counterclockwise. The former
contains m arcs and the latter has only l. Note that our choice requires that ml = (1 + κ) where
κ ≥ 0, i.e., m ≥ l. Consider the all-or-nothing strategy that sends the unit demand for every OD
pair along only one path, clockwise or counterclockwise. Using the clockwise strategy, each arc
has m units of flows and costs mn. Thus, the clockwise path costs m ·mn, while the cost of the
counterclockwise one is l · mn. Because m·m
n
l·mn =
m
l ≥ 1, the clockwise strategy is not in a user
equilibrium unless m = l. For the counterclockwise strategy, each arc has l units of flows instead
and costs ln. Similarly, the clockwise and counterclockwise path cost m · ln and l · ln, respectively.
Using the same reasoning as before, flow-bearing (or the counterclockwise) paths are less expensive
than or the same as the unused ones. Thus, the counterclockwise strategy is in user equilibrium
and yields (m + l) · ln+1 as the total travel cost. Consider MSatUE. Because it is PRUE, the
counterclockwise strategy is automatically in MSatUE. But, the clockwise one is also in MSatUE
because the cost of flow-bearing (or the clockwise) path is exactly (1 + κ) time the cost of the
shortest path, i.e., the counterclockwise one. Additionally, the total travel cost of the clockwise
strategy is (m+ l) ·mn+1. Then, the PoSat of this circular network is
(m+ l) ·mn+1
(m+ l) · ln+1
=
(m
l
)n+1
= (1 + κ)n+1.
Thus, the bound is tight. Now consider the system problem for the circular network. The problem
objective is to minimize
∑
a∈A vata(v). Using the counterclockwise strategy, the partial derivative
of the objective function with respect to va is (n+1)l
n. Then, switching to the clockwise path would
increase the total travel cost by (m − l)(n + 1)ln ≥ 0 per unit flow. Thus, the counterclockwise
strategy is system optimal because switching to the unused path does not lead to a reduction in
the total travel cost. Observe that the UE-PE-X model can capture the satisficing behavior of
network users in the circular network adequately. Let us consider λ as follow as (indices are taken
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Figure 3: The worst-case price of satisficing for n = 1 and n = 4. Note that when n = 1, the
right-hand-side of (21) becomes 4(1+κ)3−κ . For n = 1, when κ ≥ 1, we know for sure that the worst-
case price of satisficing is exactly the dotted line. When κ ≤ 1, the worst case falls in the shaded
interval between the solid line and dotted line. When n = 4, it is similar.
cyclically):
λwia =


1
1+κ for a ∈ {(j, j + 1) : j = i, i + 1, ..., i +m− 1}
1 for a ∈ {(j − 1, j) : j = i, i − 1, ..., i − l + 1}
Under the above λ, if all network users choose the clockwise path, the flow in each arc will be equal
to m, the path cost for each OD pair will be 11+km
n+1 = lmn, which is equal to the cost of the
alternative path, and thus the clockwise path is a solution to UE-PE-X and PoSatκ = (1 + κ)
n+1.
In Section 5, we will compute the PoSat numerically for these examples to confirm that UE-PE-X
is a useful model to find PoSatκ.
By Lemma 5, when travel time functions are polynomials of degree n with nonnegative coeffi-
cients, the PoSat is bounded as follows:
PoSatκ(G,Q, t) ≤


(1 + κ)n+1 if κ ≥ (n+ 1)1/n − 1,(
1
1+κ −
n
(n+1)(n+1)/n
)−1
if 0 ≤ κ ≤ (n+ 1)1/n − 1.
(21)
for all (G,Q, t) ∈ Ω(n) and by the circular network example in Figure 2, we know that there indeed
exists a network instance (G,Q, t) ∈ Ω(n) such that PoSatκ(G,Q, t) = (1 + κ)
n+1 for all κ ≥ 0.
Therefore when κ ≥ (n+ 1)1/n − 1, the bound in (21) is tight. Figure 3a shows the bounds in (21)
when travel time functions are linear or when n = 1. For smaller κ values, the worst-case PoSat
falls in the shaded interval, while for larger κ values, it is exactly (1 + κ)2. Figure 3b shows the
same bounds when n = 4 instead. When κ is zero, we have fκ = f0; hence, we must have the
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PoSat approach to 1. With this observation, we naturally ask a question: Does (1 + κ)n+1 provide
a tight bound on PoSatκ for all κ ≥ 0? We present partial answers to this question in the following
sections.
4.2 Increased Travel Demands and Travel Time Functions
We first define new sets of flow vectors. When the travel demand Qw for each w ∈ W is multiplied
by the factor 1 + κ, we define
F1+κ =
{
f :
∑
p∈Pw
fp = (1 + κ)Qw ∀w ∈ W, fp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P
}
,
V1+κ =
{
v : va =
∑
p∈P
δpafp ∀a ∈ A, f ∈ F1+κ
}
,
X1+κ =
{
x : xwa =
∑
p∈Pw
δpafp ∀a ∈ A, w ∈ W f ∈ F1+κ
}
.
The above three sets can equivalently be written as follows:
F1+κ = {(1 + κ)f : f ∈ F },
V1+κ = {(1 + κ)v : v ∈ V },
X1+κ = {(1 + κ)x : x ∈X}.
We will use ‘hat’ for flow vectors in these sets, for example, f̂κ ∈ F1+κ, while without hat in the
original sets as in fκ ∈ F .
We consider cases when the travel time functions ta(·) are polynomials of order n, in particular,
the following form of asymmetric arc travel time function for each a ∈ A:
ta(v) =
n∑
m=0
bam
(∑
e∈A
daemve
)m
=
n∑
m=0
bam
(
d⊤amv
)m
(22)
for some constants bam for m = 0, 1, ..., n and daem for e ∈ A and m = 0, 1, ..., n. Note that we use
the vector form dam = (daem : e ∈ A). The travel time function (22) is a general form of the travel
time functions considered in the traffic equilibrium literature (Meng et al., 2014; Panicucci et al.,
2007). If dam is a unit vector such that daem is 1 if a = e and 0 otherwise, we have a separable poly-
nomial arc travel time function that has been used in the literature popularly (Christodoulou et al.,
2011; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002):
ta(va) =
n∑
m=0
bam(va)
m = ba0 + ba1va + ba2(va)
2 + · · · + ban(va)
n. (23)
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Lemma 6. With the polynomial travel time function (22), for any f ∈ F , we have
C((1 + κ)f) ≤ (1 + κ)n+1C(f) (24)
for all κ ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. By simple comparison, we can show
C((1 + κ)f) = Z((1 + κ)v) =
∑
a∈A
( n∑
m=0
bam
(
(1 + κ)d⊤amv
)m)
(1 + κ)va
≤ (1 + κ)n+1
∑
a∈A
( n∑
m=0
bam
(
d⊤amv
)m)
va
= (1 + κ)n+1Z(v)
= (1 + κ)n+1C(f)
where v is the arc flow vector from f 7→ v.
4.3 Cases with Separable, Monomial Arc Travel Time Functions
As a simple case, we consider separable, monomial functions of degree n for arc travel time of the
following form:
ta(va) = ba(va)
n (25)
with a positive scalar ba for each a ∈ A and nonnegative constant n.
It is well known (Beckmann et al., 1956) that v0 ∈ F is a user equilibrium flow, if and only if
it minimizes the following potential function
Φ(v) =
∑
a∈A
∫ va
0
ta(u) du =
∑
a∈A
ba
n+ 1
(va)
n+1
when the arc travel time functions are separable, so that the integral is well defined. Similarly,
vκ ∈ V is a κ-MSatUE flow, if it is a solution to UE-PE-V , or equivalently, if it minimizes the
following potential function (Christodoulou et al., 2011)
Ψ(v;λ) =
∑
a∈A
∫ va
0
λata(u) du =
∑
a∈A
λaba
n+ 1
(va)
n+1
for some λa ∈ [
1
1+κ , 1] for each a ∈ A.
When travel time functions are separable, we can show the following result (Englert et al., 2010;
Takalloo and Kwon, 2018):
Lemma 7. When the arc travel time functions are in the form of (23), let f0 ∈ F and f̂0 ∈ F1+κ
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be the PRUE flows with the corresponding travel demands. We can show
C(f̂0) ≤ (1 + κ)n+1C(f0) (26)
for all κ ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0.
Although Englert et al. (2010) consider cases with a single OD pair only with interest in the
changes in the path travel time, the same technique can be used to prove Lemma 7 for cases with
multiple OD pairs. For completeness, we include the proof to Lemma 7 in the appendix.
Using Lemma 7, we show that a solution to UE-PE-V is an MSatUE flow.
Theorem 1. When the arc travel time functions are of the form (25), let v ∈ V be a solution to
UE-PE-V and f ∈ F is the any corresponding path flow with v
any
7−→ f . We let f̂0 ∈ F1+κ be the
PRUE flows. Then we have C(fκ) ≤ C(f̂0), and consequently C(fκ) ≤ (1 + κ)n+1C(f0) for all
κ ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Since v̂0 ∈ F1+κ is an user equilibrium flow that minimizes Φ(·), we have
Φ(v̂0) ≤ Φ
(
(1 + κ)v
)
,
which implies
∑
a∈A
ba(v̂
0
a)
n+1
n+ 1
≤
∑
a∈A
ba
(
(1 + κ)va
)n+1
n+ 1
= (1 + κ)n+1
∑
a∈A
ba(va)
n+1
n+ 1
. (27)
Since v ∈ V is a solution to UE-PE-V , we have
Ψ(v;λ) ≤ Ψ
( v̂0
1 + κ
;λ
)
,
for some λ. Therefore, we have
∑
a∈A
λaba(va)
n+1
n+ 1
≤
∑
a∈A
λaba(v
0
a)
n+1
(n+ 1)(1 + κ)n+1
=
1
(1 + κ)n+1
∑
a∈A
λaba(v̂
0
a)
n+1
n+ 1
.
Since λa ∈ [
1
1+κ , 1], we obtain
1
1 + κ
∑
a∈A
ba(va)
n+1
n+ 1
≤
1
(1 + κ)n+1
∑
a∈A
ba(v̂
0
a)
n+1
n+ 1
which implies
(1 + κ)n
∑
a∈A
ba(va)
n+1
n+ 1
≤
∑
a∈A
ba(v̂
0
a)
n+1
n+ 1
(28)
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Let us assume that C(f) > C(f̂0), which is equivalent to
∑
a∈A
ba(v̂
0
a)
n+1 <
∑
a∈A
ba(va)
n+1 (29)
From A× (27) +B × (28) + C × (29) for any positive constants A, B and C, we obtain
θ1
∑
a∈A
ba(v̂
0
a)
n+1
n+ 1
< θ2
∑
a∈A
ba(va)
n+1
n+ 1
(30)
where
θ1 = A−B + C(n+ 1)
θ2 = A(1 + κ)
n+1 −B(1 + κ)n + C(n+ 1).
In particular, consider A, B and C as follows:
A = (n+ 1)
(
(1 + κ)n − 1
)
B = (n+ 1)
(
(1 + κ)n − 1
)
+ (n+ 1)κ(1 + κ)n+1
C = κ(1 + κ)n+1
We observe that A, B and C are all positive and θ1 = 0. We also see that
θ2 = −(n+ 1)κ
2(1 + κ)n
(
(1 + κ)n+1 − 1
)
≤ 0
for all κ ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0, which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have
C(f) ≤ C(f̂0) ≤ (1 + κ)n+1C(f0),
where the last inequality is from Lemma 7. This completes the proof.
Note that the bound obtained in Theorem 1 relies on the sufficient condition, not a necessary
condition. Therefore, the result is not applicable to all MSatUE flows, although it provides a useful
bound in the framework of UE-PE models.
4.4 Cases with Separable Arc Travel Time Functions
We consider general polynomial, separable arc travel functions in the form of (23).
Theorem 2. Suppose that the arc travel time functions are in the form of (23). Let fκ ∈ F be
any κ-MSatUE and f̂0 ∈ F1+κ be the PRUE flow. Suppose that κ ≥ 0 is sufficiently small, in
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particular, so that
∑
p∈P
[cp(f̂
0)− cp(f
κ)](f̂0p − f
κ
p ) ≥ κ
∑
p∈P
cp(f
κ)
∣∣∣f̂0p − fκp ∣∣∣. (31)
Then we have C(fκ) ≤ C(f̂0). Consequently C(fκ) ≤ (1 + κ)n+1C(f0), and
sup
(G,Q,t)∈Ω(n)
PoSatκ(G,Q, t) = (1 + κ)
n+1.
Proof of Theorem 2. By slightly modifying the proof of Theorem 3, we can show C(fκ) ≤ C(f̂0).
By Lemmas 6 and 7, we complete the proof.
Theorem 2 depends on condition (31) and a similar condition appears in general asymmetric
cases as in Theorem 3. We discuss this condition in Section 4.6.
4.5 General Cases with Asymmetric Arc Travel Time Functions
We consider asymmetric arc travel time functions (22), in which case Lemma 7 is not applicable.
We first observe that the multiple of a PRUE flow, (1 + κ)f0, provides a satisficing solution to the
traffic equilibrium problem with the increased travel demand.
Lemma 8. Suppose ta(·) are polynomials of order n as defined (22). If f
0 ∈ F is a PRUE flow,
then (1 + κ)f0 is a σ-MSatUE flow with σ = (1 + κ)n − 1 in F1+κ. When n = 1, we have σ = κ.
Proof. Let f = (1+κ)f0, and v = (1+κ)v0 for the corresponding arc flow vectors. If the condition
∑
a∈A
( n∑
m=0
λambam
(
d⊤amv
)m)
(v′a − va) ≥ 0 ∀v
′ ∈ V1+κ (32)
holds for some constants λam ∈ [
1
1+σ , 1] for m = 0, 1, ..., n and a ∈ A, then we can find λa ∈ [
1
1+σ , 1]
such that
λa
n∑
m=0
bam
(
d⊤amv
)m
=
n∑
m=0
λambam
(
d⊤amv
)m
for all a ∈ A; consequently, by Lemmas 1 and 3, f is a σ-MSatUE flow in F1+κ.
Since v0 is PRUE for V , we know that
∑
a∈A
( n∑
m=0
bam
(
d⊤amv
0
)m)
(va − v
0
a) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V .
Therefore
∑
a∈A
( n∑
m=0
1
(1 + κ)m
bam
(
(1 + κ)d⊤amv
0
)m)
((1 + κ)va − (1 + κ)v
0
a) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V .
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Letting for all a ∈ A
λam =
1
(1 + κ)m
, m = 0, 1, ..., n
va = (1 + κ)v
0
a,
v′a = (1 + κ)va,
we observe that λam ∈ [
1
1+σ , 1] and we obtain (32); hence proof.
By introducing an additional condition, we compare MSatUE flows with the proportional travel
demand increase, and obtain the worst-case bound of PoSat.
Theorem 3. Let fκ ∈ F be any κ-MSatUE and f̂σ ∈ F1+κ be any σ-MSatUE flows with the
corresponding travel demands, when σ = (1 + κ)n − 1. Suppose that κ ≥ 0 is sufficiently small, in
particular, so that
∑
p∈P
[cp(f̂
σ)− cp(f
κ)](f̂σp − f
κ
p ) ≥ σ
∑
p∈P
max{cp(f̂
σ), cp(f
κ)}
∣∣∣f̂σp − fκp ∣∣∣. (33)
Then we have C(fκ) ≤ C(f̂σ). Consequently C(fκ) ≤ (1 + κ)n+1C(f0), and
sup
(G,Q,t)∈Ω(n)
PoSatκ(G,Q, t) = (1 + κ)
n+1.
Proof of Theorem 3. We decompose Pw for each OD pair w into the following four subsets:
P1w = {p ∈ Pw : f̂
σ
p > 0, f
κ
p > 0, f̂
σ
p − f
κ
p ≥ 0},
P2w = {p ∈ Pw : f̂
σ
p > 0, f
κ
p > 0, f̂
σ
p − f
κ
p < 0},
P3w = {p ∈ Pw : f̂
σ
p > 0, f
κ
p = 0},
P4w = {p ∈ Pw : f̂
σ
p = 0, f
κ
p > 0}.
We ignore cases with f̂σp = 0 and f
κ
p = 0. Note that f̂
σ
p − f
κ
p > 0 for p ∈ P
3
w and f̂
σ
p − f
κ
p < 0 for
p ∈ P4w. From the definition of MSatUE flows, we have
f̂σp > 0 =⇒ cp(f̂
σ) ≤ (1 + σ)µw(f̂
σ),
fκp > 0 =⇒ cp(f
κ) ≤ (1 + κ)µw(f
κ),
for all p ∈ Pw, w ∈ W. In addition, µw(f̂
σ) ≤ cp(f̂
σ) and µw(f
κ) ≤ cp(f
κ) for all p ∈ P by
definition. Therefore, we have
∑
p∈P
[cp(f̂
σ)− cp(f
κ)](f̂σp − f
κ
p )
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≤
∑
w∈W
{ ∑
p∈P1w
[
(1 + σ)µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p ) +
∑
p∈P2w
[
µw(f̂
σ)− (1 + κ)µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p )
+
∑
p∈P3w
[
(1 + σ)µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p ) +
∑
p∈P4w
[
µw(f̂
σ)− (1 + κ)µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p )
}
=
∑
w∈W
{ ∑
p∈Pw
[
µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p ) + σ
∑
p∈P1w∪P
3
w
µw(f̂
σ)(f̂σp − f
κ
p )
− κ
∑
p∈P2w∪P
4
w
µw(f
κ)(f̂σp − f
κ
p )
}
≤
∑
w∈W
{ ∑
p∈Pw
[
µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p ) + σ
∑
p∈Pw
max{µw(f̂
σ), µw(f
κ)}
∣∣∣f̂σp − fκp ∣∣∣
}
≤
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
[
µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p ) + σ
∑
p∈P
max{cp(f̂
σ), cp(f
κ)}
∣∣∣f̂σp − fκp ∣∣∣.
From (33), we obtain
0 ≤
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈P
[
µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
]
(f̂σp − f
κ
p )
=
∑
w∈W
[
µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
](∑
p∈P
f̂σp −
∑
p∈P
fκp
)
=
∑
w∈W
[
µw(f̂
σ)− µw(f
κ)
]
(Q̂w −Qw)
= κ
∑
w∈W
µw(f̂
σ)Qw − κ
∑
w∈W
µw(f
κ)Qw
=
κ
1 + κ
∑
w∈W
µw(f̂
σ)Q̂w − κ
∑
w∈W
µw(f
κ)Qw
≤
κ
1 + κ
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
cp(f̂
σ)f̂σp −
κ
1 + κ
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
cp(f
κ)fκp
=
κ
1 + κ
C(f̂σ)−
κ
1 + κ
C(fκ).
Lemmas 6 and 8 complete the proof.
Note that condition (33) is stronger than condition (31) for separable travel time functions.
This is natural, since we consider more general classes of travel time functions.
4.6 Illustrative Examples
For the illustration purpose, we consider two examples in Figure 4 with linear travel time functions,
where n = 1. In Example 1, the travel time function in the first arc is not increasing. We can verify
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O D
t1(v1) = 1
t2(v2) = 1 + v2
(a) Example 1
O D
t1(v1) = v1
t2(v2) = v2
(b) Example 2
Figure 4: Examples where the travel demand is Q from node O to node D.
that
maxC(fκ) =

Q+ κ
2 if κ ≤ Q, with fκ = (Q− κ, κ)
(1 +Q)Q if κ ≥ Q, with fκ = (0, Q)
among all κ-MSatUE flows in F and
C(f̂0) = (1 + κ)Q with f̂0 = (1 + κ)f0 = ((1 + κ)Q, 0).
among all κ-MSatUE flows in F1+κ. Comparing the two quantities, we observe C(f
κ) ≤ C(f̂0)
in both cases. To prove Theorem 3, condition (31) needs to hold only for these two flow vectors.
Regardless of the value of κ, however, it is impossible to satisfy condition (31), although the worst-
case PoSat bound (1+κ)n+1 still holds for all κ ≥ 0. The price of satisficing is 1+ κ
2
Q if κ < Q and
1 +Q if κ ≥ Q in this example, both of which are less than (1 + κ)2.
On the other hand, in Example 2, we have strictly monotone travel time functions in both arcs.
Similarly, we consider
maxC(vκ) =
2 + 2κ+ κ2
(2 + κ)2
Q with fκ =
(
Q
2 + κ
,
(1 + κ)Q
2 + κ
)
C(v̂0) =
(1 + κ)2
2
Q with f̂0 = (1 + κ)f0 =
(
(1 + κ)Q
2
,
(1 + κ)Q
2
)
and can verify that C(fκ) ≤ C(f̂0) for all κ ≥ 0. In Example 2, we note that (33) holds for
κ ≤ 0.206. In this example, we observe that the price of satisficing is 2(2+2κ+κ
2)
(2+κ)2 , which is no
greater than (1 + κ)2 for all κ ≥ 0.
4.7 Other Approaches
When there is a single origin and multiple destinations, i.e., a single common origin node, in the
network, Kleer and Scha¨fer (2016) introduces the notion of the deviation ratio that compares the
system performances of the user equilibrium and the equilibrium with deviated travel time functions
t˜a(·). The notion of deviation may also be interpreted as perception in our definition. In a special
case, the deviation ratio is reduced to the price of risk aversion (Nikolova and Stier-Moses, 2015)
that compares the performances of equilibria among risk-averse and risk-neutral network users.
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Kleer and Scha¨fer (2016) define the (separable) deviated travel time functions with the following
bounds:
ta(va) + αta(va) ≤ t˜a(va) ≤ ta(va) + βta(va) (34)
where −1 ≤ α ≤ 0 ≤ β. The consideration of this deviated travel time function generalizes our
UE-PE model where α = − κ1+κ and β = 0. Kleer and Scha¨fer (2016) show that the worst-case
deviation ratio with (34) is bounded by
1 +
β − α
1 + α
⌈
|N | − 1
2
⌉
Q.
Therefore, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4 (Kleer and Scha¨fer, 2016). Consider a directed graph with a single common origin
node with the total travel demand Q and let |N | be the number of nodes. Then we have
Z(vκ)
Z(v0)
≤ 1 + κ
⌈
|N | − 1
2
⌉
Q (35)
where vκ is a solution to UE-PE-V in (16).
Note that Theorem 4 only covers a subset of the entire MSatUE flows, as it is limited to the
solutions UE-PE-V in (16) and is applicable to cases with a single common origin. When Theorem
4 is applied in the examples in Figure 4, the bound (35) becomes 1 + κQ.
5 Numerical Bounds
To quantify PoSat in typical traffic networks and compare it with the analytical bound obtained
in Theorem 3, we define the worst-case problem for the total system travel time under MSatUE as
follows:
max
vκ
Z(vκ) =
∑
a∈A
za(v
κ
a ) =
∑
a∈A
ta(v
κ)vκa (36)
subject to vκ is an MSatUE flow with κ
To quantify the benefit of satisficing, instead of maximizing, we can minimize the objective function
(36). Since MSatUE involves path-based definition and formulation, (36) is numerically more
challenging to solve. Instead, we replace MSatUE by UE-PE-X. We know that the UE-PE-X.
models provide a subset of MSatUE traffic flow patterns as seen in Lemmma 1; hence by using
UE-PE-X models, we will obtain suboptimal solutions to (36).
Using UE-PE-X in (12), we formulate the worst-case problem as follows:
max
v,x,ε
Z(v) =
∑
a∈A
za(v) =
∑
a∈A
ta(v)va (37)
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subject to
∑
a∈A
∑
w∈W
(ta(v)− ε
w
a )(x
w
a − x
w
a ) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈X (38)
vκa =
∑
w∈W
xwa ∀a ∈ A (39)
x ∈X (40)
0 ≤ εwa ≤
κ
1 + κ
ta(v) ∀a ∈ A (41)
Problem (37) is an instance of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We
can replace the equilibrium condition (38) by the following KKT conditions to create a single-level
optimization problem:
ta(v)− ε
w
a + pi
w
i − pi
w
j ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ W, a ∈ A (42)
xwa (ta(v)− ε
w
a + pi
w
i − pi
w
j ) = 0 ∀w ∈ W, a ∈ A (43)∑
a∈A+i
xwa −
∑
a∈A−i
xwa = q
w
i ∀w ∈ W, i ∈ N (44)
The resulting problem is a mathematical program with complementarity conditions (MPCC), which
is nonlinear and nonconvex. Finding a global solution to MPCC problems is in general difficult,
and Kleer and Scha¨fer (2016) has shown that solving the above MPCC optimally is NP-hard. In
order to solve this problem, we use an interior point method by utilizing the Ipopt nonlinear solver
(Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006) with multiple starting solutions.
5.1 Numerical Experiments
In this section we present some examples to compare the total travel times in MSatUE and PRUE
numerically for both separable and asymmetric networks. We approximate MSatUE by UE-PE-X
and solve it by the Ipopt nonlinear solver, after reformulating (36) as a single-level optimization
problem using KKT conditions. We use the Julia Language and the JuMP package (Dunning et al.,
2017) for modeling and interfacing with the Ipopt solver.
5.1.1 Simple Networks
To test the validity and the strength of UE-PE-X model, we first consider Examples 1 and 2 in
Figure 4. Figure 5 compares the PoSat under UE-PE-X with the PoSat under MSatUE, obtained in
Section 4.6. As Figure 5 shows, the PoSat under UE-PE-X is equal to the the PoSat under MSatUE
for both examples, which suggests that the UE-PE-X model is an effective model.
5.1.2 Circular Network of Christodoulou et al. (2011)
We also compute the PoSat under UE-PE-X model for the circular network of Christodoulou et al.
(2011) presented in Figure 2. For numerical experiments, we assign m and l to the smallest positive
integers such that ml = (1+ κ)
5, and κ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}. We also set n = 4. As it can be seen in
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Figure 5: PoSat for the simple networks in Figure 4
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Figure 6: PoSat for the circular network in Figure 2
Figure 6, we obtained identical results for circular network under UE-PE-X, using the Ipopt solver,
which shows that the UE-PE-X model can obtain the upper bound provided in Lemma 5.
5.1.3 Larger Networks
We present some examples to compare the total travel times in MSatUE and PRUE numerically
and compare the numerical worst-cases with the analytical bound given in Theorem 2 for larger
networks with both separable and non-separable, asymmetric arc cost functions. As (36) is a
non-convex problem, the Ipopt solver can produce a local minimum at best. To obtain a higher-
quality local minimum, we solve the problem multiple times by using different initial solution. For
generating different initial solutions for the network with separable arc cost functions, we utilize
UE-PE-V model. We generate initial λ randomly and use the Frank-Wolfe algorithm to obtain the
corresponding v and x. For the network with non-separable cost function, we can use the fixed
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Figure 7: PoSat for nine-node network
point method (Dafermos, 1980) with a randomized λ to obtain an initial solution x. We randomly
generate five initial starting points for each example and report the largest PoSat values.
We first consider the nine-node network presented in Hearn and Ramana (1998). The nine-node
network consists of 9 nodes and 18 arcs, and the travel time functions are polynomials of order
n = 4. We also create an asymmetric variant of the nine-node network as shown in Figure 9 in
Appendix B. The asymmetric nine-node network has non-separable arc cost function in the form
of (49). The comparison result is presented in Figure 7a. As Figure 7a represents PoSatκ increases
with κ for both symmetric and asymmetric nine-node network since PRUE total travel time is fixed
with respect to κ, while the worst-case MSatUE total travel time increases as κ increases. Moreover,
PoSatκ is smaller for symmetric nine-node network compared to the asymmetric nine-node network
for smaller κ values (0.1 and 0.2), but it is greater for larger κ values (κ ≥ 0.3). In general, the gap
between PoSatκ for symmetric nine-node network and asymmetric nine-node network is small.
Figure 7b compares the numerical PoSatκ with the analytical bound provided in Theorem 2 for
MSatUE for the nine-node network. We observe that there is a large gap between the analytical
and numerical bounds which increases with κ. Although the analytical result certainly provides
a valid bound, it is too large to be practically useful in realistic road networks. This indicates
opportunities for empirical studies on the analytical bounds that depend on more network-specific
information such as travel demands and travel time functions. The bound (1 + κ)n+1 in Theorem
2 is independent from such network-specific information.
We also consider the Sioux Falls network presented in Suwansirikul et al. (1987), which consists
of 24 nodes, 76 arcs, and 576 OD pairs. The arc travel cost function is the BPR function, which is
a polynomial function with degree n = 4. We also consider an asymmetric variant of Sioux Falls
network with arc cost function in the form of (49). As Figure 8a represents, PoSatκ increases with
κ for both symmetric and asymmetric Sioux Falls network, and it is greater compared to the nine-
node network for both symmetric and asymmetric networks. Furthermore, PoSatκ is greater for
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Figure 8: PoSat for Sioux Falls network
asymmetric Sioux Falls network compared with the symmetric Sioux Falls network for all positive κ
values, and the gap between PoSatκ for symmetric Sioux Falls network and PoSatκ for asymmetric
Sioux Falls network increases with κ. Figure 8b compares the numerical PoSatκ with the analytical
bound. The gap between the analytical and the numerical bound is tighter compared to the nine-
node network, but it is still considerable.
6 Concluding Remarks
When network users are satisficing decision makers, the resulting satisficing user equilibria may
degrade the system performance, compared to the perfectly rational user equilibrium. To quantify
how much the performance can deteriorate, this paper has quantified the worst-case analytical
bound on the price of satisficing. We also quantified the price of satisficing for several networks
numerically and compare it to the analytical bound.
As we have seen in the numerical examples in this paper, there is a large gap between the
worst-case analytical bound and the actual bound. Clearly, this is a limitation of our approach. In
the literature of the price of anarchy have similar observations been reported (O’Hare et al., 2016;
Monnot et al., 2017; Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2017). Likewise, the behavior of the price of satisficing
in practice can be quite different from what we have observed in this paper. Deriving empirical or
network-specific bounds can be meaningful contributions as a future research direction.
We suggest additional potential future research directions. For the proposed analytical bound,
our result is based on the condition (33). By attempting to relax this condition, one may obtain
a global bound for any value of κ. In deriving the analytical bound, we utilized a novel technique
comparing equilibrium patterns before and after the travel demand is increased; namely V and
V1+κ. Applying this technique in the context of the price of risk aversion and the deviation ratio
would be an interesting research direction.
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 7
Proof of Lemma 7. This is a minor variant to the proof of Englert et al. (2010, Theorem 3). Since
v0 ∈ F and v̂0 ∈ F1+κ are PRUE flows that minimize Φ(·) over their corresponding feasible sets,
we have
Φ(v0) ≤ Φ
( v̂0
1 + κ
)
and Φ(v̂0) ≤ Φ
(
(1 + κ)v0
)
,
which imply
(1 + κ)n+1
∑
a∈A
ba
n+ 1
(v0a)
n+1 ≤
∑
a∈A
ba
n+ 1
(v̂0a)
n+1 (45)
and ∑
a∈A
ba
n+ 1
(v̂0a)
n+1 ≤ (1 + κ)n+1
∑
a∈A
ba
n+ 1
(v0a)
n+1 (46)
respectively.
Let us assume that C(f̂0) > (1 + κ)n+1C(f0), which is equivalent to
(1 + κ)n+1
∑
a∈A
ba(v
0
a)
n+1 <
∑
a∈A
ba(v̂
0
a)
n+1. (47)
From n× (45) + ((n + 1)(1 + κ)n − 1)× (46) + ((1 + κ)n − 1)× (47), we obtain
θ1
∑
a∈A
ba(v
0
a)
n+1
n+ 1
< θ2
∑
a∈A
ba(v̂
0
a)
n+1
n+ 1
(48)
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Figure 9: Asymmetric nine-node network
where
θ1 = n ·
(1 + κ)n+1
n+ 1
− ((n+ 1)(1 + κ)n − 1) ·
(1 + κ)n+1
n+ 1
+ ((1 + κ)n − 1) · (1 + κ)n+1 = 0
θ2 = n ·
1
n+ 1
− ((n+ 1)(1 + κ)n − 1) ·
1
n+ 1
+ ((1 + κ)n − 1) = 0
for all κ ≥ 0. Therefore, (48) leads to 0 < 0, which is a contradiction. We conclude that C(f̂0) ≤
(1 + κ)n+1C(f0).
B Nine-node Asymmetric Networks
In order to test the performance of UE-PE-X model in an asymmetric network, we create an
asymmetric version of the nine-node network considered by Hearn and Ramana (1998). In the
asymmetric nine-node network, which has been shown in Figure 9, we add a few additional arcs
and assume that the arc travel cost function is:
ta(v) = Aa +Ba
(
0.5vâ + va
Ca
)4
(49)
where â is the flow in the opposite arc. Thus, the arc travel function depends not only on the flow
in that arc, but also on the flow in the arc in opposite direction. The values of parameters Aa, Ba
and Ca are given in Table 1 for each arc.
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Table 1: asymmetric nine-node network arc cost function parameters
a Aa Ba Ca
(1,5) 12 1.80 5
(1,6) 18 2.70 6
(2,5) 35 5.25 3
(2,6) 35 5.25 9
(5,6) 20 3.00 9
(5,7) 11 1.65 2
(5,9) 26 3.90 8
(6,8) 33 4.95 6
(6,9) 30 4.50 8
(7,3) 25 3.75 3
(7,4) 24 3.60 6
(7,8) 19 2.85 2
(8,3) 39 5.85 8
(8,4) 43 6.45 6
(9,7) 26 3.90 4
(9,8) 30 4.50 8
(5,1) 12 1.80 5
(6,1) 18 2.70 6
(5,2) 35 5.25 3
(6,2) 35 5.25 9
(6,5) 20 3.00 9
(7,5) 11 1.65 2
(9,5) 26 3.90 8
(8,6) 33 4.95 6
(9,6) 30 4.50 8
(3,7) 25 3.75 3
(4,7) 24 3.60 6
(8,7) 19 2.85 2
(3,8) 39 5.85 8
(4,8) 43 6.45 6
(7,9) 26 3.90 4
(8,9) 30 4.50 8
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